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updates from the regional human rights systems
African Regional and
Sub-regional Courts
Historic Opportunity for Justice in
East Africa
“The East African Court of Justice
(EACJ) needs your initiative to empower
it to handle the cases, structures, and
archives of the ICTR after the Tribunal
closes,” urged Hassan Jallow, Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in a paper read by
fellow prosecutor Paul Ngarua before East
African heads of state on October 5, 2009.
These remarks took many by surprise
and have initiated a contentious debate
concerning the prospect of a permanent
mechanism for the adjudication of human
rights cases in eastern Africa.
The most significant obstacle to Jallow’s proposal, as pointed out by Rwandan
Ombudsman Tito Rutaremara, is that the
“EACJ is not a penal court.” The jurisdiction of the EACJ is limited to handling the
regional blocs’ affairs in accordance with
the Treaty Establishing the East African
Community (EAC Treaty). Presently, the
EAC Treaty provides the EACJ no explicit
subject matter jurisdiction over genocide,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Accordingly, to enable the EACJ to
assume the competency and jurisdiction
of the ICTR, the EAC Council would
have to enact an additional protocol to the
EAC Treaty. Article 27 of the EAC Treaty
explicitly envisages this possibility, stating that jurisdiction could be expanded
to include “such other original, appellate,
human rights and other jurisdiction as will
be determined by the [EAC] Council at a
suitable subsequent date.”
Additional objections to Jallow’s proposal came from Rwandan officials who
assert that the ICTR is still in negotiations
with the Rwandan government concerning the transfer of ICTR cases to Rwandan courts in Kigali. As Rwandan EACJ
Judge Emily Kayitesi explained, Rwanda
has already begun taking steps, such as
upgrading detention facilities and building capacity within the judicial sector, to
prepare for this possibility.

It remains uncertain whether the Rwandan government can bring its legal system
in line with international standards before
the ICTR’s mandate expires in 2012. In
2008, ICTR judges denied applications
by ICTR prosecutors to transfer five cases
to Rwandan courts, citing the insufficient
capacity of the Rwandan justice system to
ensure witness protection. Nevertheless,
Rwandan objections may pose an obstacle
to the EACJ’s adoption of the mandate of
the ICTR. To be implemented, Jallow’s
proposal needs the consensus of the EAC
Council, and therefore, Rwandan support
is critical.
Although expanding the competency
and jurisdiction of the EACJ would require
the allocation of significant additional
resources and personnel, doing so would
bring the EAC more closely in line with the
goals underlying its establishment. According to Articles 6(d) and 123(3)(c) of the
EAC Treaty, the promotion and protection
of human rights is a foundational principle
of the EAC. Article 6(d) states that the
principles that shall guide the work of
the EAC are “adherence to the principles
of democracy, the rule of law, accountability, transparency, social justice, equal
opportunities, gender equality, as well as
the recognition, promotion and protection
of human and peoples rights in accordance
with the provisions of the African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights.”
Additionally, there are numerous advantages to adjudicating human rights cases at
the regional level. One of the most prominent is that the close economic, political,
and cultural ties of neighboring states
may make enforcement of judgments more
likely. Proximity of regional courts to the
litigating parties could also reduce travel
costs and allow for greater victim participation in proceedings. Lastly, a regional
court may be better positioned to address
transnational conflicts.
Incorporating human rights into the
EACJ’s jurisdiction would also facilitate
greater access to justice for individuals
and non-state actors filing claims based
on human rights violations. Currently, the
continent-wide African Court of Justice
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(ACJ) does not provide standing to most
individuals and non-state actors. According to Article 34(6) of the ACJ Protocol,
individuals and non-state actors can bring
claims before the ACJ only if they are
nationals of a country that has made an
official declaration of exception. Currently,
Burkina Faso is the only AU Member State
that has made this declaration.  
In light of the unprecedented work completed by the ICTR and the substantial challenges that will follow in its wake, Jallow’s
proposal represents a historic opportunity
for justice in East Africa. By expanding the
competency and jurisdiction of the EACJ
to enable the Court to adjudicate remaining
ICTR cases, enforce ICTR sentences and
witness protection measures, and manage
ICTR archives, the EAC could simultaneously enable a new mechanism for regional
human rights protection. As such, carrying
out the ICTR Chief Prosecutor’s proposal
has the potential to dramatically reshape
justice in East Africa.

ECOWAS Court and the Promise of
the Local Remedies Rule
On November 20, 2009, the Council of
Ministers of the Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS) meets
to discuss pending proposals. One of the
most contentious issues promises to be a
proposal put forth by the Gambian government to restrict access to the ECOWAS
Community Court of Justice.
The two components of the Gambian
proposal that have elicited the strongest
backlash are amendments to Articles 9(4)
and 10(d) of the Supplementary Protocol
A/SP.1/01/05 of the Community Court
of Justice. Article 9(4) provides that “the
Court has jurisdiction to determine cases
of violation of human rights that occur in
any Member State.” Article 10(d) provides
that “access to the Court is open to . . .
individuals on application for relief for
violation of their human rights.” The proposed amendments seek to curtail the reach
of both articles by adding two requirements: first, that domestic remedies must
be exhausted before a case can be heard by
the Court; second, that the subject matter of
a human rights claim before the Court must
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fall within the scope of an international
human rights instrument ratified by the
respondent country.
Within ECOWAS, the Gambian government’s proposal has received strong
criticism from legal experts. The Gambian
Foroyaa newspaper reported that, in a
meeting of legal experts convened by the
ECOWAS Commission from September
28 to October 3 to discuss the Gambian
proposals, representatives of all Member States except The Gambia criticized
the proposals. At a subsequent meeting,
the ECOWAS Ministers of Justice unanimously rejected the Gambian proposal.
Civil society organizations have also
rebuked the Gambian government’s proposal. The Socio-Economic Rights and
Accountability Project (SERAP) and the
Centre for Defence of Human Rights and
Democracy in Africa (CDHRDA) initiated
legal action on September 28 against The
Gambia before the ECOWAS Community
Court of Justice. In their suit, SERAP and
CDHRDA challenge the legality of the
Gambian proposal under the ECOWAS
Treaty. The lawsuit requests declarations
by the Community Court of Justice that
the Gambian proposal “infringes [on] the
provisions of the ECOWAS Treaty and the
Supplementary Protocol,” and “is unlawful and of no legal effect because of [The
Gambia’s] continuing disobedience [of] the
judgments and orders of the Community
Court of Justice.”
While requiring that the subject matter
of human rights lawsuits fall within the
scope of international human rights instruments ratified by the respondent country
could restrict access to justice, requiring
claimants to exhaust local remedies would
not. Indeed, it has been argued that necessitating the exhaustion of local remedies
(the local remedies rule) carries with it
numerous benefits.
By requiring plaintiffs to first seek
resolution of claims in domestic courts,
the local remedies rule can prevent the
development of contradictory interpretations of law between national courts and
the Community Court of Justice. Local
proceedings may also be cheaper and more
effective by virtue of their proximity to
the location of the alleged human rights
violation. Additionally, because Article 76
of the ECOWAS Revised Treaty states that
rulings of the Community Court of Justice are “final and shall not be subject to

appeal,” first instance lawsuits filed before
the Community Court of Justice waive
the potential benefits of judicial review.
With the local remedies rule in place, parties retain the option to appeal against an
erroneous ruling in a first instance trial.
Moreover, lodging a complaint against a
government in national courts provides
a government the opportunity to respond
without the drama of a lawsuit on the international stage. Meanwhile, the prospect
of subsequent review by the Community
Court of Justice may provide complainants leverage to obtain more generous
settlements at the domestic level, and may
encourage domestic courts to more closely
track international standards.
On account of many such benefits,
the local remedies rule is widely implemented both globally and regionally. At
the global level, Article 2 of the Optional
Protocol of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights requires that the
complainant has “exhausted all available
domestic remedies,” before submitting a
complaint to the Human Rights Commission. At the regional level, Article 50 of
the Charter establishing the African Court
of Human and Peoples’ Rights requires that
“all local remedies, if they exist, have been
exhausted” before the Court may exercise
jurisdiction. Similarly, the local remedies
rule is present in Article 26 of the European Convention on Human Rights and
Article 46(1)(a) of the American Convention on Human Rights.
In light of the potential benefits of
the local remedies rule proposed by the
Gambian government, a critical and balanced debate is warranted. If the ECOWAS
Council of Ministers takes advantage of
this opportunity and rejects the position set
forth by the Ministers of Justice, the Community Court of Justice could become a
model for the adjudication of human rights
cases at the regional level.

European Court of
Human Rights
Deportation of Iranian Refugees
Declared Unlawful, Discriminatory
Asylum Practices Go Unmentioned
Turkey’s decision to deport two Iranian refugees violated the European
Convention on Human Rights, according
to a recent decision by the European
Court of Human Rights. Decided on
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September 22, 2009, Abdolkhani and
Karimnia v. Turkey held that because the
applicants, two former members of the
Iranian People’s Mujahedin Organization, would likely have been tortured or
killed if forced to return to Iran, Turkey’s
decision to deport them constituted a
human rights violation.
Abdolkhani and Karimnia initially traveled to Turkey in April 2008 after the Iraqi
refugee camp where they had been staying
closed. Upon arrival the applicants were
arrested and sent back to Iraq. They immediately reentered Turkey and on June 21,
2008, were arrested again. Even though
Turkey knew that the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) recognized
Abdolkhani and Karimnia as political refugees, a Turkish court convicted them
of illegal entry and attempted to deport
them once more, this time to Iran. When
Iran refused to allow their return, Turkey
detained Abdolkhani and Karimnia without further explanation or access to legal
counsel. They have remained in custody
since June 2008.
Since Turkey knew that the applicants
would likely face physical harm if deported
to Iraq or Iran, the Court held that Turkey’s
action exposed them “to an arbitrary deprivation of life, detention and ill-treatment in
their country of origin” and thus violated
their rights under Article 3, the prohibition
of torture. The Court also determined that
Turkey’s failure to provide Abdolkhani
and Karimnia with both an explanation
for their post-trial detention and access
to legal counsel violated the applicants’
rights under Article 5, the right to liberty
and security, and Article 13, the right to an
effective remedy.
Although the Court did find Turkey’s
actions violated the Convention, the decision failed to address the underlying issue
of this case: discrimination against refugees based on national origin. Turkey’s
1994 Asylum Regulation defines a refugee
as a “foreign national who, as a result of
events occurring in Europe,” has a wellfounded fear of persecution. Turkish law
thus allows the granting of asylum to Europeans, whereas non-Europeans may remain
in Turkey only temporarily while they
seek resettlement elsewhere. As the vast
majority of asylum seekers originate from
Iran, Iraq, Somalia, and Afghanistan, these
geographical limitations severely impact
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thousands of individuals seeking refuge in
Turkey.
Because the Court did not mention
the issue of discrimination, an immediate change to Turkey’s asylum policy is
unlikely. Although it has been working
with the UNHCR to reform its asylum
laws, Turkey currently has no host country
agreement and still does not grant refugee
status to non-Europeans.
The international community remains
hopeful that the Court’s decision will catalyze policy change. Deljou Abadi, Director
of the Iranian Refugees’ Alliance, Inc. and
legal representative for Abdolkhani and
Karimnia, praised the Court’s decision as
“underlin[ing] the longstanding call for
Turkey to bring its laws and practices relating to asylum, deportation and detention of
refugees and asylum seekers in line with
international standards.” This optimism,
however, may be premature. Despite the
Court’s ruling, Abdolkhani and Karimnia
remain detained as of October 13, casting
serious doubt on the decision’s potential to
change Turkish policy in the near future.

Progress Report Raises Questions of
Commitment to Court’s Authority
A progress report presented to the Council of Europe (CoE) Parliamentary Assembly by Christos Pourgourides, a rapporteur
assigned to monitor implementation of
the Court’s decisions, revealed that of the
47 CoE Member States, 36 have failed to
execute critical Court judgments five or
more years after the cases were decided.
Article 46 of the European Convention
binds Member States to Court judgments
and designates the Committee of Ministers to monitor enforcement progress. The
new report, declassified on September 11,
2009, expressed concern over the increasing number of cases pending before the
Committee of Ministers, which has risen
from 2,298 in 2000 to 6,614 in 2008.
According to Pourgourides, three categories of unenforced decisions are particularly prevalent: death or mistreatment by
state officials without adequate investigation; exceedingly lengthy judicial proceedings; and non-enforcement of domestic
judicial decisions. Cases involving death
or mistreatment by state officials generally address violations of Articles 2 and
3 of the Convention. These cases are of
principal concern because Articles 2 and 3
embody the most fundamental guarantees

of the Convention, the right to life and
the prohibition of torture. The report specifically noted Bulgaria, Greece, Russia,
and Turkey as countries with outstanding
judgments in this category of cases. The
second and third subjects Pourgourides
identified as serious problem areas pertain
to malfunctions in domestic judicial processes. Greece, Italy, and Poland are the
leading Member States with cases presenting claims of lengthy judicial proceedings,
while Turkey and Russia have the most
unenforced cases dealing with the failure
to enforce domestic court decisions.
According to the report, Russia has
one of the worst records of implementing
judgments, signaling a lack of commitment to the Court. As of October 1, 2009,
Russia had approximately 690 judgments
pending before the Committee of Ministers. According to Kommersant, a Russian newspaper, “In Russia the European
Court is often treated [as] an anti-Russian
organization, whose verdicts are directed
against the state.” Additionally, a recent
Human Rights Watch report noted that in
several cases Russia has flatly contested
the Court’s findings. These sentiments
severely inhibit compliance with Court
decisions.
Lack of enforcement of Court decisions
is a significant obstacle to the advancement of human rights in Europe. When
Member States fail to enforce Court decisions, unlawful practices remain uncorrected, and the same injustices continue
to appear in new cases before the Court.
This places a considerable burden on the
Court, “distracting it from its essential
function.” Had earlier decisions been effectively implemented, the Court would not
need to spend time repeatedly addressing
systematic problems.
Improving enforcement of Court decisions requires active involvement of the
Parliamentary Assembly. To this end Pourgourides has engaged in dialogue with 11
Member States that have had significant
implementation problems. Still, steadfast
commitments from domestic governments
to abide by final judgments are the “principal pillar” for the efficacy of the Court.
Pourgourides concludes his report with a
call to action, stressing to Member States
that “without speedy and full execution
of the Strasbourg Court’s judgments [by
domestic governments,] there can be no
justice.
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Death of Italian G8 Protester Not a
Violation of Right to Life
On August 25, 2009, the Grand Chamber issued a judgment in Giuliani and
Gaggio v. Italy. This case addressed Italy’s
responsibility in the death of Carlo Giuliani, a protestor shot by an officer of the
Italian carabinieri (police) at the 2001
Group of Eight Summit in Genoa. The
Court found no violation of Giuliani’s right
to life under Article 2 of the European Convention concerning excessive use of force
or Italy’s positive obligations to protect
life. It did, however, hold that Italy violated
Article 2 by failing to adequately investigate his death.
The 2001 Summit was characterized by
violent clashes between anti-globalization
protestors and law enforcement officers.
On July 20, during one such demonstration, a carabiniere vehicle was surrounded
by a crowd as violent protesters advanced
on the three officers inside. After issuing
a warning, a carabiniere in the vehicle
fired two shots, one of which hit Giuliani
in the head, fatally wounding him. In the
subsequent confusion, the officers drove
over Giuliani’s body twice as they fled the
scene.
Unhappy with the status of the investigation and prosecution of their son’s
case in Italy, Giuliani’s parents and
sister brought this action before the
Court. In their complaint, Giuliani’s
family members alleged several violations of the Convention. Principally,
they asserted that Italy’s use of excessive
force, failure to maintain public order,
and failure to launch an effective investigation amounted to a failure to protect
Giuliani’s right to life and a breach of
Article 2.
The Court found no violation of the
Article 2 provisions banning the use of
excessive force and requiring states to
preserve public order. Because the carabinieri acted in self defense, reasoned
the Court, the officers were not responsible for Giuliani’s death. Additionally,
it concluded, they did all they could to
manage the situation.
The Court did, however, declare that
Italy violated Article 2 provisions concerning the procedural obligations of
domestic investigations. Under Article 2,
state investigations of a homicide must
clearly “establish the cause of death.”
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In this case, the premature decision
to allow Giuliani to be cremated and
failure to conduct an extensive study
of ballistic evidence severely inhibited
the investigation, making comprehensive
calculations of the accident scene nearly
impossible.
The Court’s decision on this controversial issue left critical questions unanswered. Italian news sources speculated
as to why the Court acknowledged a
violation of Article 2, labeled as “one of
the most fundamental provisions in the
Convention,” solely on the procedural
obligations rather than on the substantive issue of protecting the right to life.
The main reason the Court found no
violation of the substantive obligations
was the incomplete autopsy and forensic
examination, which prevented investigators and the Court from forming conclusions on the manner of Giuliani’s
death. The Court nevertheless found
the Italian government responsible for
these investigative “shortcomings” in
declaring a violation of the procedural
obligations of Article 2, punishing the
State for infringing on the right to life
without explicitly declaring a human
rights violation.

Inter-American System
IACtHR Expands Jurisprudence on
Right to Privacy in the Americas
The Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (IACtHR) condemned Brazil’s use
of wiretaps to illegally monitor two organizations in Paraná State associated with
the Landless Movement (Movimento dos
Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra, MST), a
social movement that redistributes fallow
land owned by wealthy fazendeiros (farmers) to the poor. Escher v. Brazil, decided
July 6, 2009, expands the right to privacy
enshrined in the American Convention on
Human Rights (ACHR).
Between May 5 and 12, 1999, Paraná
State Military Police officers petitioned
Judge Elisabeth Khater of the Loanda
District Court to authorize two separate
requests to intercept and monitor telephone
lines belonging to ADECON (Associação Comunitária de Trabalhadores) and
COANA (Cooperativa Agrícola de Conciliação Avante Ltda) — two organizations associated with the MST. Judge
Khater authorized the request without a

time limit, void of explanation, and subsequently failed to notify the Office of the
Public Prosecutor about the request, violating the required procedural safeguards in
authorizing such request.
In June 1999, the Military Police played
extracts of conversations recorded from
tapping these phone lines, on a nationally televised news program and held a
press conference at which it played sections of the recordings and disseminated
written transcripts of the conversations
to journalists. In July 1999, the Military
Police presented the recordings to Judge
Khater. She did not forward the materials
to the Office of the Public Prosecutor until
March 2000, almost one year after the
wiretapping began. In September 2000, the
Office of the Public Prosecutor announced
that the investigation was illegitimate and
politically motivated — a mere pretext to
monitor the MST. Moreover, the Office
of the Public Prosecutor issued an opinion
that found that the victims’ rights to intimacy, privacy and freedom of association
under the Brazilian Constitution had been
violated and requested the Loanda District
Court to declare the interceptions invalid.
Judge Khater, however, ordered the tapes
incinerated in April 2002.
On May 15, 2007, Arlie José Escher and
Luciano de Vargas, members of ADECON
and COANA and two of the named petitioners in the case before the IACtHR, sued
Paraná State in the Fourth Property Court
of Curitiba for reparations. Vargas’s civil
suit was dismissed and Escher’s civil action
is pending final judgment.
The IACtHR found that Brazil violated
the organizations’ right to privacy, honor,
and reputation recognized in Article 11 of
the ACHR (Right to Privacy), by unlawfully
intercepting, recording, and disseminating
the victim’s telephone conversations. The
Court noted the Brazilian government may
legitimately intercept a telephone conversation within the bounds of the ACHR
if the interception is (a) established by
law; (b) has a legitimate purpose; and (c)
is appropriate, necessary, and proportionate. In this case, the Court found that the
State did not comply with the requirement
of legality, as the interceptions violated
Federal Statute No. 9,296/96. Further, the
IACtHR found that Brazil violated Article
11 by disseminating private conversations
that were protected by judicial confidentiality without following legal safeguards.
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Moreover, the IACtHR found that Brazil
violated the right to freedom of association recognized in Article 16 of the ACHR
(Freedom of Association) because COANA
and ADECON were illegally monitored
only because of their political and ideological leanings. The Court also found that
Brazil violated the rights to judicial guarantees and judicial protection recognized
in Articles 8(1) (Right to a Fair Trial) and
25 (Right to Judicial Protection) of the
ACHR.
Escher expands the scope and applicability of Article 11 of the ACHR to
take scientific and technological progress
into consideration. Importantly, the Court
demands that the State adapt traditional
means to protect the right to privacy as the
fluid nature of information makes privacy
more susceptible to abuse. While wiretapping was a widespread law enforcement
mechanism at the time the ACHR was
drafted, the Court appears to create legal
precedent that will allow the Court to
deal with other technologies in subsequent
cases.
Furthermore, Escher places the InterAmerican jurisprudence on par with the
European human rights system. In Halford v. UK (1997), the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) found that the
UK violated Allison Halford’s right under
Article 8 (Right to Privacy) of the European Convention of Human Rights when
her supervisor, a senior police officer,
intercepted her telephone conversations.
The decision was important as it reinforced
the right to privacy at work, a public place.
Moreover, in the Case of Liberty and Others v. UK (2008), the ECtHR similarly
found protected privacy interests in various
aspects of telephone conversations, and
condemned the use of illegal government
phone-tapping practices.
Escher, however, does not invalidate the
State’s authority to limit privacy rights for
the common good, as it firmly states that
the right to privacy is not absolute. The
facts in Escher illustrate governmental
abuse of that authority where the wiretappings were politically motivated, unlawful,
and served no legitimate law enforcement
purpose. As IACtHR Judge Sergio García Ramírez’s concurring opinion notes,
because the abuse of authority exemplified
in Escher is emblematic of the realities
across the hemisphere, it is important for
an impartial body like the IACtHR to rule
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on these issues, as it is insulated from
domestic rhetoric that falsely pits public
safety against fundamental rights.

Venezuela Violated Judge’s Rights
after Arbitrary Dismissal
The IACtHR held that Venezuela failed
to provide an effective remedy and equal
access to public services after the Political
Administrative Chamber of the Venezuelan
Supreme Court of Justice (SPA) refused
to reinstate a judge who was unlawfully
dismissed. Trujillo v. Venezuela, decided
June 30, 2009, underscores that the current
judicial restructuring process in Venezuela
is not an excuse to infringe on judicial
independence.
María Trujillo served as a provisional
First Instance Judge of the Criminal Judicial Circuit in Caracas from July 21, 1999
to February 26, 2002. The Commission
for the Operation and Restructuring of the
Judicial System (CFRSJ) then dismissed
Trujillo alleging that she was involved in
“abuse or excessive use of authority” and
that she failed to “exercise due attention
and diligence.” On October 13, 2004, the
SPA found Trujillo had not committed the
alleged offenses and nullified the dismissal
order, but did not reinstate Trujillo to her
former position nor require payment of her
outstanding salaries. The SPA explained
that as a provisional judge, Trujillo could
not be immediately reinstated but she could
participate in public competitions to be
considered for similar judicial positions
as the SPA’s decisions expunged all documents regarding her unlawful dismissal.

The IACtHR found that Venezuela violated Article 25(1) (Right to an Effective
Remedy) of the ACHR when it denied
Trujillo’s reinstatement. Immediate reinstatement is the adequate remedy in a
case of a judge dismissed without proper
justification. The IACtHR also found that
Venezuela violated Article 23(1) (Right to
Participate in Government) of the ACHR
because Trujillo suffered arbitrary unequal
treatment when she should have had the
right to remain in public service as a provisional judge. The IACtHR prescribed,
among several reparations, the reinstatement of Trujillo to a similar position to the
one previously occupied.
The IACtHR strongly condemned the
appointment and removal of these temporary judges without prior or consistent procedures and the lack of guarantees against
unjustified dismissals. Furthermore, it condemned that temporary judges in Venezuela can serve for years without obtaining
tenure, and thereafter be removed. The
IACtHR stated that Venezuela could not
justify its refusal to reinstate a provisional
judge as a necessary part of restructuring
its judiciary. The IACtHR noted that while
Venezuela’s goals of restructuring to create competitive and transparent processes
in judge selection are consistent with the
ACHR, its implementation, which has now
lasted over ten years, has proven to be
ineffective and poses a threat to judicial
independence. The Trujillo decision articulates that providing judges with tenure,
the possibility of promotion, and guarantees against unjustified dismissal militate towards greater judicial independence.
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Without these safeguards, however, judicial
independence is at serious risk.
The ruling is not the first time international human rights watchdogs have
criticized Venezuela’s use of provisional
judges. Human Rights Watch reports that
the UN Human Rights Committee was
concerned that “Venezuelan judges could
be removed for merely fulfilling their
judicial duties.” Moreover, in 2003, the
Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights stated that “having a high percentage of provisional judges has a serious
detrimental impact on citizens’ right to
proper justice and on the judges’ right to
stability in their positions as a guarantee of
judicial independence and autonomy.” The
IACtHR’s decision in Trujillo is consonant
with the views of these other human rights
bodies. 		
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